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ABSTRACT  
The EU has frequently presented Northern Ireland as a ‘model’ for conflict management, 
especially in the Balkans. The paper questions whether the EU had a strategic and 
coherent input into the Northern Ireland peace process through its Peace and 
Reconciliation Programs and argues that the rational logic of its actions hinged more on 
the goals of the Delors Commission for self-empowerment and competence expansion. 
Despite EU rhetoric, the development of EU conflict management instruments and policy 
since the late 1990s do not appear to be informed by the Northern Ireland ‘model’. 
Indeed, that model’s substantive elements – consociationalism, a lack of transitional 
justice, embedding sectarian structures – contravene EU norms of conflict management. 
The lack of transferable lesson-learning and the disjuncture between EU normative 
rhetoric about ‘multiethnicity’ and the realities of ethnic division are explored in the case 
of Kosovo.  
 1
Over the last decade the EU has steadily developed a narrative about its positive role in 
bringing the conflict in Northern Ireland to an end. Repeatedly, EU statements have 
stressed that it acted as a ‘beacon for positive movement’ and that the peace process 
demonstrates the validity of the ‘European peace-making model’.1 The framing of 
Northern Ireland as a ‘model’ for EU conflict management strategy is frequently stressed 
by the Commission. At a January 2008 press conference with the First and Deputy First 
Ministers of the new government for Northern Ireland, Ian Paisley and Martin 
McGuinness, respectively, Commission President Barroso pointedly observed that the 
region had conflict management ‘expertise’ to be drawn on: ‘Northern Ireland is a 
success story that can be an inspiration for other parts of Europe—we still have problems 
in our continent—and for other parts of the world’. More recently, Commissioner Hubner 
stated that ‘The Commission has always maintained that the experiences of the 
International Fund for Ireland, as well as those of the PEACE programme should be 
recorded with a view to sharing them with other regions facing similar problems’.2 The 
author was recently told by a Commission official dealing with the Western Balkans: 
‘Northern Ireland is on our radar screens as a model for the Western Balkans’.3 
 
What has the EU learned from its engagement in Northern Ireland’s peace process since 
1995? What was the strategic logic behind this engagement in the first place, and have 
there been transferable lessons that have informed policy in the Balkans? This paper 
analyses EU involvement in Northern Ireland and Kosovo to explore the extent of any 
lesson learning in how the EU has developed, conceptualised and implemented its 
conflict management strategy. 
 
 
 
Comparing Root Causes and Dynamics of Conflict 
 
EU engagement in Northern Ireland predates that of Kosovo by about 5 years and I begin 
by mapping the broad similarities and differences between the two conflicts. Northern 
Ireland and Kosovo are bi-national small places, where violent conflict is the product of 
historically rooted antagonisms derived from territorial partitions and repartitions, and 
systemic political and socio-economic discrimination by privileged hegemonic groups 
against unprivileged subordinate groups. In both cases politics hinges on a challenge or 
questioning not only of the legitimacy of government policy, but also of the legitimate 
authority of the state itself. These contested territories, consequently, should be properly 
understood within a wider European context of the challenges posed by territorialized 
minorities to the territorial integrity of states (Kosovo as an integral part of Serbia, 
Northern Ireland as an integral part of the UK), and of the political power of irredentism 
and national unification projects. The deep divisions in both places reflect reinforcing 
ethnic, religious and national differences, even though the relative strength of these 
identities has fluctuated over time and in practice secularism has become more 
pronounced in the late twentieth century. The two cases have a reverse order of 
hegemony and subordination. In Northern Ireland a hegemonic majority ethnonational 
group (Protestant British ‘Unionists’) penalized a subordinate minority ethnonational 
group (Catholic Irish ‘Nationalists’). In Kosovo a hegemonic minority ethnonational 
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group (Orthodox Serbs) penalized a subordinate majority ethnonational group 
(Muslim/Catholic Albanians). In both cases sudden socio-economic modernization and 
raised living standards over a few decades after World War II led to demographic 
changes that altered the balance of power between the communities. In particular, the 
surge in demographic growth of the subordinated communities (Irish Catholics, Kosovar 
Albanians) made an ethnic hegemonic regime increasingly untenable without the use of 
coercion by mass repression and/or mass expulsion. 
 
There are legitimate questions, however, about the contingent as opposed to the root 
causes of the conflicts. For some ‘integrationists’ the immediate context from which 
violence erupted is a better explanation of the dynamics of the conflicts. This approach 
focuses on the violent state repression of peaceful democratization movements: the 
Unionist attempts to crush the 1960s civil rights movement in Northern Ireland, and the 
Serbian oppression of Rugova’s non-violent protest movement, leading to mass 
expulsions of Albanians from public service employment and the removal of Kosovo’s 
autonomy status under Milosevic in the 1990s. Most studies of these conflicts treat the 
competing ethnonationalisms as forms of false consciousness that were contingently 
mobilized and ensued from the drift into violent conflict. The so-called ‘social 
transformation’ scholarship, uniting Liberal and Leftist-leaning scholars, tends to argue 
that the space for a more liberal civic society might have opened had states pursued 
reforms and removed the causes of antagonism (discrimination and legislating for a more 
equal citizenship).6 
 
The context of discrimination immediately prior to the eruption of violence in both 
cases, however, was also part of a longer term continuum of decades and perhaps 
hundreds of years of discriminatory practices, where hegemonic groups penalized 
subordinate groups because their ethnicity and/or national identity was perceived to be a 
threat to the existence of hegemony and the state itself.7 The structural features and 
epiphenomena of the conflicts, such as discrimination, inequality, injustice, sectarianism, 
racism and segregation, are derived from the ‘root causes’ of ethnic and national enmity. 
If one accepts nationalism as the key driver one must also recognize that national 
unification projects play a major role, though these may for practical or policy reasons 
fluctuate in their public salience. The institutional arrangements that have been devised to 
manage both conflicts recognize ethnic and national enmity as the key drivers and have 
opted for power-sharing solutions. 
 
In Northern Ireland, The Belfast Agreement (1998) provided for a complex web of 
institutions and policies to entrench ethnonationally based consociational structures in 
government and society. It accepts the fundamental division between the ‘two 
communities’ as the basis for power-sharing institutional arrangements. 
In this case, the institutional and governing design is pivoted on a ‘separate but equal’ 
philosophy encapsulated in the notion of ‘parity of esteem’ for the two main 
communities. A similar design and philosophy has been incorporated into the design for 
an independent Kosovo elaborated by the United Nation’s Ahtisaari Plan (2007), which is 
built around the notion of a ‘multiethnic’ Kosovo. Despite the fact that the Albanian 
majority in Kosovo is estimated at over 90% of the population and the Serb minority was 
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overwhelmingly forcibly displaced in 1999, a concept of state ‘multiethnicity’ has been 
imposed in Kosovo. However, the institutionalization of ‘multiethnicity’ in a new 
constitution and several pieces of enabling legislation passed in 2008 is a more diluted 
form of ethnic power-sharing compared with Northern Ireland and is being implemented 
in practice in a manner that is informed by a ‘separate but equal’ concept of the state. 
 
Aside from the international military intervention by NATO and UN administration in 
the case of Kosovo, perhaps the key difference between the two conflicts in terms of their 
internal dynamics is in the scale and intensity of the forced displacement of populations. 
In the case of Northern Ireland, forced ethnic displacement was temporally confined to 
the early years (1969–1971) of the conflict, was small scale (a few thousand), and was 
aimed at a consolidation of ethnic territories within the confines of the state (i.e. there 
was no attempt to expel the subordinated minority community to the Republic of 
Ireland). This simply reflected the fact that the two communities already lived in a 
high degree of segregation. In Kosovo, by contrast, ‘ethnic cleansing’ was on the level 
of the population as a whole. It involved attempts first by the Serbs and then by 
Albanians to homogenize Kosovo in their favour. The end result was that Kosovo’s 
Serbian population (some 200,000–250,000 strong) was almost totally expelled in 1999–
2000 in the wake of the NATO military intervention, the withdrawal of Serb security 
forces and the establishment of a UN mandated Kosovo Force (KFOR) in June 1999.8 
This fact makes institutional and policy fixes based on multiethnicity, consociationalism 
or integrationism redundant, as there is no longer a minority community of any 
significant strength. 
 
The Disconnect between the Northern Ireland ‘Model’ and EU Conflict Management 
UK, Irish, US and EU leaders have presented the Northern Ireland conflict as a ‘model’ 
of conflict resolution, but what kind of ‘model’ do they have in mind? Commission 
President Barroso referred to Northern Irish ‘expertise’ on conflict management and 
dialogue and its lessons for other conflicts, but without specifying what this entailed or 
how it could be deployed in practice. The EU narrative at root appears to be a 
reaffirmation of the key role played by economic development in promoting peace, for as 
Barroso has stated: ‘Northern Ireland has now emerged as an example to the world on 
how to succeed in promoting peace and reconciliation in a deeply divided community. Its 
political leaders have recognized the importance of economic success in this process, and 
of the role of the European Union in the drive for growth and jobs. Just like the emerging 
European Community of 50 years ago, the story of Northern Ireland shows that people 
from different communities, sometimes with fundamentally different opinions, can 
overcome the divisions, work together and share a common future’.9  
 
For EU leaders, the connection between Northern Ireland and peace appears to 
confirm and reinforce the EU’s own developmental model. The origins of the EC lie in 
the attempt to overcome the European divisions that caused World War II by building 
interstate cooperation around the notion of economic ‘common interests’, and thereby 
creating a functional logic for political integration. As a Commission official told the 
author, this is the ‘European way’ and it informed the Commission’s thinking about 
how to advance peace in Northern Ireland.10 
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Political leaders, almost universally, have shied away from explicit endorsements of 
consociationalism as the key conflict resolution instrument in the case of Northern 
Ireland. For rather than attest to the value of the complex institutional engineering, they 
have emphasized the importance of the process of mediation itself (the ‘peace process’, 
‘dialogue’, ‘talking with terrorists’, etc). Former Secretary of State for Northern Ireland 
Peter Hain, for example, in a speech at Chatham House in London in June 2007 
promoting Northern Ireland as a ‘model’ of conflict resolution, identified four main 
components: the role of personalities, the aligning of international influence, the political 
framework and dialogue. According to Hain, the ‘detailed structures are secondary to a 
basic political will to agree’, and developing dialogue in the peace process was ‘arguably 
. . . its ultimate objective’.12 For Hain, Northern Ireland offered lessons for conflicts as 
diverse as Iraq, Sri Lanka, Basque Country, Kashmir and Western Sahara. A key British 
negotiator and Blair advisor, Jonathan Powell, has also recently argued that the 
importance of the Northern Ireland agreement lies in the way that engaging and ‘talking 
to terrorists’ moved them from violence to democratic politics. Controversially, he 
posited that a similar process of engagement is required with Al Qa’ida.13 The Petraeus 
‘doctrine’ in Iraq of engaging the secular Sunni insurgents applied a similar logic, and 
more recently a similar policy rhetoric has emerged with regard to engaging Taliban 
‘elements’. For British policy-makers, the substance of the ‘model’ is dialogue, but this 
grossly underestimates the importance of the institutional and other outcomes of conflict 
settlement. As a consequence of the success in Northern Ireland, the Irish government has 
placed conflict mediation at the core of its stated foreign policy objectives 
through its Conflict Resolution Initiative. Drawing on the experience of the peace 
process, the Irish government aims to become a ‘world leader’ in UN mediation efforts, 
and has begun to establish a number of special roving ambassadors to crisis regions.14 
Former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari had a long engagement as a peace mediator 
in Northern Ireland and no doubt brought some of this experience to his 
conceptualization of the Kosovo problem and the promotion of consociational power-
sharing arrangements as a means of conflict resolution in Kosovo. Yet, even he too, in his 
public speeches on peace-making, is overwhelmingly concerned with the ‘professional 
mediation process’ rather than the institutional and other ingredients of settling 
conflicts.15 
 
There is clearly a disjuncture between how the Northern Ireland ‘model’ is being framed 
by politicians and how it is being instrumentalised in conflict resolution. The expertise of 
endogenous actors, those former protagonists in the conflict, is being drawn on in 
mediation and dialogue in international conflicts. Former Secretary of State for Northern 
Ireland,  Paul Murphy, was engaged in mediation in Sri Lanka. As part of the mediation 
exercise Martin McGuinness, former Chief of Staff of the IRA and now Deputy First 
Minister in the Northern Ireland government, visited Sri Lanka in January and June 2006. 
McGuinness also co-chaired with former South African Government Minister Roelf 
Meyer mediation talks between Iraqi groups, held in Finland in September 2007, which 
led to the so-called ‘Helsinki Agreement’ between Sunni and Shia groups.16 These talks 
were an important factor in the creation of the political climate that led to the ‘Sunni 
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Awakening’ and the co-option of secular Sunni forces by the USA, thus largely defusing 
the insurgency. 
Both aspects of the peace process, the institutional design and the dialogue, are 
obviously important, but that there is such reticence in proclaiming the value of 
consociationalism as an outcome tells us that there is a powerful liberal normative 
ideological resistance to championing this form of conflict resolution, and a reluctance 
among policy-makers to elaborate publicly on the inherently ‘separate but equal’ 
substance of the ‘model’. This normative resistance to explicit endorsement of power-
sharing as a conflict resolution tool is also illustrated by EU conflict management 
strategy and its position on Kosovo. First, however, let us examine the logic underpinning 
the EU’s engagement in Northern Ireland and the nature of its role. 
 
 
The Strategic Logic of EU Action in NI: Empowering Delor’s ‘Social Model’ 
 
There have been several important sources of funding for peace-building and 
reconciliation in Northern Ireland, including direct grants from the UK government, the 
International Fund for Ireland established by the Anglo-Irish Agreement (1985), and the 
Atlantic Philanthropies (a foundation funded by Irish-American entrepreneur Chuck 
Feeney), but the EU’s Special Support Programmes for Peace and Reconciliation (PR) in 
Northern Ireland are by far the largest and most thematically targeted.  
 
Engagement by EC/EU institutions in conflict management in Northern Ireland was 
heavily constrained by the structural configuration of institutional power. This conflict 
occurred within an existing member state. The increasing cooperation of the British and 
Irish governments, in particular following the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985, meant that 
two member states were deeply involved in the management of the conflict. Until the 
landmark shifts towards European Union and the development of the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CFSP) in the mid-to-late 1990s, the EC/EU lacked the legal 
and functional capacity to engage in any conflict management, let alone interfere directly 
in the internal politics of a member state. It was only in the latter 1990s—by which time 
the Northern Ireland conflict was in the final stages of resolution—that the EU 
established key instruments that became the foundation for its conflict management 
strategy, such as the strengthened High Representative for CFSP, the Special 
Representatives system, the accession process and its conditionality leverage, including 
the Enlargement Directorate-General (DG) and its annual monitoring and reporting 
mechanism for the Commission. A European Security Strategy on conflict management 
was only elaborated in 2001 in the Goteborg Programme (see below)3. Thus, in the case 
of Northern Ireland, the EU not only lacked the toolbox of instruments that came to shape 
and characterize its role in conflict management in the Western Balkans, the Caucasus 
and elsewhere, but also there was no legal basis for direct engagement. That the conflict 
occurred within a member state was an enormous political constraint. What, then, 
explains the Commission’s engagement through major funding programmes from 1995? 
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The most plausible strategic logic for the engagement of the EU in the Northern Ireland 
conflict is that its PR funding was initiated and driven forward by a key agent - Jacques 
Delors (Commission President in 1993–1994), primarily as an opportunity to 
empower the Commission and enlarge its competences. The IRA ceasefire provided an 
opportune window for Delors to act. It was politically difficult for the Council or member 
states to oppose as normatively packaged an activity as peace and reconciliation, and 
politically extremely difficult for the UK and Irish governments to oppose such a 
spending ‘windfall’ or ‘peace dividend’. The peace programme has evolved 
in three sequential stages: Peace I (1995–1999); Peace II (2000–2004) and the Peace II 
Extension (2005–2006); and Peace III (2007–2013) (hereafter PR-I, PR-II and PR-III). 
Between 1995 and 2004 the EU committed over E1.66 billion to its Peace I and II 
Programmes in Northern Ireland, while Peace III (running to 2013) involves an additional 
E2.25 billion. Moreover, several hundred billion euros have been injected into the British 
and Irish government’s vehicle for promoting peace—the International Fund for 
Ireland—since the mid-1980s.5 
 
The EU, however, was not merely a passive donor to policy efforts by the British and 
Irish governments. Commission President Jacques Delors was keen to promote an EU 
‘social model’ post-Maastricht. He saw the EU’s PR-I as a major social experiment in 
how social partnerships could be used as a developmental tool to advance European 
Union, even though the focus was to be placed on community reconciliation and conflict 
resolution according to EU priorities. What British Thatcherites termed ‘backDelors 
Socialism’ yoked the open market economy of the common market to a social policy 
package that included a minimum level of social provision, educational equality, social 
partnership and a role for non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in ‘governance’. In 
essence, the Delors vision of ‘partnership’ was an instrument to circumvent obstructive 
national governments. PR-I was the EU’s first major funding initiative directed at this 
broader political goal and Northern Ireland was to be a test for the European notion of 
‘partnership’ as a dialogue and consensual decision-making process between politicians 
and social interests in the provision of public goods. The emphasis was on ‘bottom-up’ 
delivery mechanisms, where the greatest share of the funding is managed by locally 
based partnership structures and by NGOs.19 
 
The injection of EU funding on such a massive scale contributed to a redefinition of the 
political landscape in Northern Ireland by empowering civil society and weakening state 
control over the ‘community relations’ agenda. The initiation of the PR-I by the 
Commission in 1995, with the support of the UK and Irish governments, tapped into a 
pre-existing social capital capacity and a joint governmental concept of the role of 
reconciliation in bringing an end to the conflict. In the 1970s and 1980s this policy fell 
under the generic policy heading of ‘community relations’.18 There was a persistent 
tension in British government policy between a ‘security’ policy of coercion (using 
military means to establish and maintain control and order in Northern Ireland), and an 
‘developmental’ policy, which held that the conflict was essentially caused by problems 
of ‘backwardness’ (under-development such as social exclusion, social need and 
inequality, which were primarily experienced by the Catholic Nationalist community, 
leading to its political alienation). The organizational structure for the 
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implementation of the EU funding balanced the decisional power of state officials and 
national- and local-level politicians by including representatives of social partners, 
including the community and voluntary sectors, the private sector, as well as European 
Commission officials. Not surprisingly, the process created much tension between the 
different interests, as elected representatives felt usurped by the new-found power of civil 
society and the new enhanced role of the Commission. 
 
The EU funding was injected into a place where there was a substantial capacity for 
‘partnership’. Indeed, PR-I and its successors have operated through the existing 
community relations expertise and civil society apparatus. The EU relied on the apparatus 
of the Northern Ireland Voluntary Trust Community (NIVTC) that had been built up by 
successive British governments, but this was essentially a segregated voluntary sector. 
There was also enormous tension between ‘old’ versus ‘new’ community organizations, 
and even much debate and concern among policy-makers over what constituted a 
‘community organization’. The paradox at work here was the fear on the part of policy-
makers that funds would end up with paramilitaries (and the bad publicity that would 
result), while the paramilitaries were key hubs of community organization, especially on 
the Nationalist side. 
 
While PR-I had a strategic logic for Delors, it lacked any strategic substance as regards  
developing peace and reconciliation. Beyond the generic concepts of promoting its social 
model of ‘partnership’ and a reliance on civil society as the foundation for building peace 
and reconciliation, there was no strategy for what the funding should deliver. The 
priorities for the EU’s PR-I programme were generated locally, by NIVTC, not by the 
Commission- evidently because the Commission lacked the capacity to define what the 
strategy should be on the ground. In the thematic priorities we see 
obvious evidence of the tension between contradictory priorities and policy approaches: 
between the ‘social’ need dimension (development, employment, capacity-building, 
regeneration) and the ‘political’ (human rights and constitutional issues). Robert 
Putnam’s work on social capital, notably his ideas about the connection between social 
networks, community engagement, ‘civic virtue’ and democracy, had a tremendous 
influence on how civil society activists in Northern Ireland shaped the EU funding 
priorities. PR-I focused on ‘capacity-building’, i.e. building social capital within the two 
communities.20 
 
For the implementation of PR-II, it was recognized by the Commission and its local 
agents that PR-I had made a strategic error by overweighting capacity-building within the 
communities at the expense of cross-community work and the development of what 
became known as ‘bridging’ or ‘bonding’ social capital. Consequently, PR-II prioritized 
projects that involved joint participation by both communities only. Anecdotal evidence 
suggests much of this ‘partnership’ was of a formalistic pragmatic nature to secure the 
funds. From PR-II to PR-III the Commission and the British and Irish governments 
asserted a greater strategic hold over the programme and focused more on the EU’s 
‘Lisbon Agenda’ of economic growth. There is also a question as to how much of this 
funding is being recycled and renamed from other funds that would have gone to 
Northern Ireland and cross-border economic development in any event.21 As a 
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consequence, the EU strategy shifted to placing a higher priority on economic 
development, especially stronger cross-border economic development, and downplayed 
‘community work’. The recent report of the Barroso Task Force on Northern Ireland to 
assess the impact of EU funding, claimed the whole PR programme as a success, but also 
finally graduated Northern Ireland from the need for such funding and imposed explicit 
economically defined priorities lifted from the Lisbon Agenda for future EU funding.22 
 
One of the most striking impacts of the EU funding has been on making peace-making a 
major business opportunity. By the time of the Belfast Agreement in 1998, according to 
UK government figures, there were approximately 5,000 voluntary and community 
organizations alone in Northern Ireland, which provided employment to some 33,000 
people. By this stage of the conflict there were more people engaged in the community 
relations sector than were employed in manufacturing industry in Northern Ireland. The 
gross annual income for the sector was estimated to be around £500 million.27 Not 
surprisingly, the EU funding has not only extended the life of community relations 
organizations (what some may critically refer to as ‘NGO darlings’ or ‘NGO royalty’), 
but it has also generated a new professionalized ‘mediation’ business, and facilitated the 
integration of the senior cadre of the sector into the international peace and conflict 
management industry. 
 
 
The EU’s Lack of Strategic Thinking on ‘Peace and Reconciliation’ 
 
When the consultation exercise for PR-I was rolled out by EU officials, despite the 
labeling there was no prior strategic discussion about what peace and reconciliation 
meant or entailed, or could be delivered. Discussion about reconciliation rendered the 
term ever more contested in Northern Ireland. Even the academic and practitioner 
literatures are inconsistent, as the term is given multiple meanings and is disfigured by 
ambiguous jargon. A public debate about reconciliation began as part of PR-I project 
implementation on key themes such as human rights, victims and survivors, and truth 
commissions. It was in this context that a leading US advocate of reconciliation, Jean 
Paul Lederach, was invited to Northern Ireland for the first time in 1995. He introduced 
the idea of ‘conflict transformation’ as a more progressive alternative concept to the 
contested and politicized term ‘reconciliation’. Perhaps reflecting the relative strength of 
religious organizations working in the fields of reconciliation, community relations and 
mediation in Northern Ireland, it is Lederach’s work that has most informed practitioners 
since the mid-1990s.23 Lederach’s vision of ‘conflict transformation’ has also infiltrated 
the public policy arena; for this is also a philosophy of social activism for practitioners. It 
requires a core of enlightened believers who will push the ‘conflict transformation’ 
process. Local government project initiatives on reconciliation are even titled ‘Conflict 
Transformation’.24 
 
The substantive content of the notion of ‘conflict transformation’ is less easy to discern. 
Lederach criticizes the ‘narrowness of resolution approaches’ (no doubt such as 
consociationalism) because although they may solve problems in the short term, they do 
not create a dynamic of interpersonal ‘constructive change’. His is not an approach that is 
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concerned with the nitty-gritty institutional outcomes to a political accommodation. But 
what kind of ‘constructive change’ does Lederach envisage? This is never fully 
explained; rather, Lederach resorts to generic notions such as building positive 
‘relationships’, ‘changing lives for the better’ and building ‘capacities which are creative, 
responsive, constructive, and non-violent’ (Lederach, 2003, pp. 69, 70). 
The 1998 Belfast Agreement placed the concept of reconciliation among its foremost 
aspirations and included a separate section under this heading. Although we are not 
offered a clear definition as such, we are presented with several components of a 
working definition of reconciliation that informs the Belfast Agreement. There is a 
value-based component: an elite ethos of compromise and a societal ethos of mutual 
respect and understanding (elsewhere referred to in the Agreement as ‘parity of esteem’). 
There is a social capital component (funding organizations engaged in what we might 
term ‘community relations’). There is a policy component: overcoming sectarian 
polarization in the areas of housing and education.25 How these components were to be 
activated was not specified in the Agreement, the bulk of which detailed the complex 
constitutional arrangements. 
 
It is on the issue of reconciliation that we see a major fissure developing from the late 
1990s between governments and political parties on the one hand and the more liberal 
cosmopolitan elements of civil society on the other. By the late 1990s, following political 
changes in Latin America and South Africa, and in response to conflicts in Africa, the 
Western Balkans and elsewhere that involved genocide and mass ethnic killing and 
displacement, a new international normative drive had gained momentum around the 
concept of ‘transitional justice’. The concept has four key dimensions: restorative justice 
(essentially trials—punishing perpetrators, ensuring impunity does not go unpunished), 
reparations (supporting victims and securing compensation), truth-seeking (normally 
through a ‘truth commission’, public hearings, eliciting statements of regret and 
wrongdoing, developing a consensus narrative and a culture of forgiveness) and, finally, 
institutional reform (primarily in the field of policing, civil–military relations and 
justice). The implicit assumption in the concept is that a transparent process of catharsis 
and punishment allows post-conflict societies and democratizing states to move forward. 
Paradoxically, while the UK, Irish and US governments and the EU were in the forefront 
of the international drive for transitional justice, all were agreed that there should be no 
such process in Northern Ireland. None of the parties had anything to gain from truth-
telling about the ‘dirty war’, and the Agreement itself hinged on a modified form of 
amnesty for all the parties to the conflict. There was to be no truth commission, which 
might uncover evidence of states crimes, and prisoners from groups adhering to a 
ceasefire would be offered an ‘accelerated release’ scheme. While there was a focus on 
compensation and assistance to victims, even this was highly politically sensitive given 
that there is no agreement on what the term ‘victim’ means. The disagreement has 
blocked any significant memorialization of the victims.26 In practice, Northern Ireland is 
a major exception to the international norm of imposing transitional justice on post-
conflict states. This is another important feature of the ‘model’ that the EU and other key 
national and international actors are reticent in drawing attention to. 
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What then are the transferable lessons, if any, from Northern Ireland? Has the Northern 
Ireland ‘model’ informed EU thinking to optimize its conflict management strategy? Has 
it informed EU policy in Kosovo as the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo 
(EULEX) mission evolves? 
 
 
 
 
The EU’s Role in Kosovo 
 
A major difference between the EU’s role in Kosovo is that time has seen EU develop its 
political union, institutional capacity in external relations and the Commission’s 
competences. The latter’s capacity to impose conditionality and intervene in the internal 
affairs of countries with a membership perspective has increased dramatically since the 
enlargement process to former communist countries beginning in 1997. The EU 
has a number of instruments for direct involvement, from its Special Representative, 
currently Pieter Feith, the Commission Liason Office, headed by Renzo Daviddi, and the 
EULEX mission mandated by the European Council in February 2008 and operating 
under the UN ‘umbrella’. Kosovo is outside the EU and seeks membership. It is de 
facto part of the EU’s Stabilization and Association Process (SAP), though the 
nomenclature differs slightly as Kosovo operates under a mirror instrument—the Stability 
Tracking Mechanism. The Commission monitors progress, and provides reports and 
recommendations on how to approach and achieve the targets that the Council has set out 
in the European Partnership for Kosovo.28 The European Council and EU leaders have 
repeatedly stated that Kosovo has a ‘clear European perspective, in line with the 
European perspective of the region’, which is code for the membership track. However, 
Kosovo’s ‘European Partnership’ process with the EU is legally linked to that of 
Serbia.29 In theory, the EU has all of the accession conditionality levers at its disposal in 
Kosovo, with all of their strengths and weakness of implementation, compliance and 
credibility. However, the divisions within the EU (and internationally) over the 
recognition of Kosovo’s declaration of independence of February 2008 have created 
major dilemmas and legal uncertainties for enhanced EU action in Kosovo. So far, 60 UN 
member states and 22 EU states have recognized Kosovo. Five EU member states refused 
to recognize the unilateral declaration of independence (Slovakia, Spain, Greece, Cyprus 
and Romania), thus blocking an ‘EU’ recognition. 
 
As in Northern Ireland, the EU major contribution is as the largest payer for peace. As the 
largest donor to Kosovo, so far the EU funding commitment from 1999 to the present 
stands at some E1.8 billion. This figure will increase further as a result of the European 
Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) mission in the rule of law area (EULEX) and an 
additional E800 million committed by the Commission and EU member states at the 
Donors’ Conference for Kosovo hosted by the Commission in Brussels in July 2008.30 
Kosovo has also benefited from EU autonomous trade preferences since 2000. The EU is 
the main trading partner of Kosovo and also with reference to foreign direct investments, 
which in 2007 represented 10.0% of GDP. In contrast to Northern Ireland, and despite the 
success attributed to the PR programmes in Northern Ireland by the EU, the EU has not 
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provided such targeted PR programmes for Kosovo. According to Commission sources, 
much of its funding simply went directly to underwriting the United Nations Mission in 
Kosovo (UNMIK), and the many non-EU (often American) consultants.31 According to 
UNMIK, the EU was the largest donor in 2006, underwriting about 30% of its costs. The 
question then is what kinds of programme and targeting priority are being employed by 
the EU and what lessons, if any, has the EU learnt from the PR programmes in Northern 
Ireland? 
 
In contrast to Northern Ireland, the EU has been a major player in the military 
intervention through its member states’ participation in NATO’s KFOR operation and in 
the subsequent UN administration and international negotiations over the future of 
Kosovo. This more active role means that the EU is pivotal to the strategy of conflict 
management based on the idea of imposing stability by creating a ‘multiethnic Kosovo’, 
as proposed by the ‘Ahtisaari Plan’ (March 2007), discussed later. Moreover, reflecting 
the different state capacities and social capital between Northern Ireland and Kosovo, the 
EU has a significant and increasing presence on the ground—indeed, the goal was to 
create a EULEX mission some 3,000 strong, though the final deployment as of summer 
2009 is well below this target. The EULEX mission was envisaged in the ‘Ahtisaari Plan’ 
and followed on from the priorities identified in the Commission’s Kosovo Progress 
Report (2007) which stressed the weak rule of law and judicial capacity.32  
 
The function of EULEX is to build state and social capital in order to deliver on the 
‘multiethnic’ strategy.33 The contrast between the EU’s limited role in Northern Ireland, 
restricted to funding, and its strategic role in Kosovo, combining funding and political 
management, is a reflection also of the different institutional involvement from the EU 
side. In Northern Ireland (a member state issue) the EU’s engagement was directed by the 
Commission, whereas in Kosovo (an external issue) it was the Council taking the lead in 
conflict management and in EULEX. The fact that EULEX took more than 1 year 
actually to deploy (even if below its intended complement) is indicative of the EU 
divisions, the difficulties of deploying on the ground in Kosovo, and the EU’s weakness 
in attracting the skilled personnel required for such post-conflict reconstruction missions. 
 
 
The EU Strategy for a ‘Multiethnic Kosovo’  
 
The ‘Ahtisaari Plan’ of March 2007, which was fully supported by UN Secretary-General 
Ban Ki-moon, proposed that Kosovo be led towards ‘independence, supervised by the 
international community’, but on the condition that a constitutional framework 
guaranteed that the new state would be a ‘multiethnic’ one, with protections and 
privileges for the Serb and other minority communities.34 Ahtisaari presented his plan as 
the ‘best compromise’, but he seems to have prejudged his task, for he interpreted the 
‘maximum leeway’ given to him by the Secretary-General as one that would result in ‘no 
return to the pre-conflict status’ of Kosovo as part of Serbia. Ahtisaari, and presumably 
also the Secretary-General, assumed that Kosovo was ‘primarily a European issue’, and 
therefore the aim was to secure a ‘UN exit and an EU takeover’.35 Divisions in the UN 
Security Council and the threat of a Russian veto meant that the plan was not approved 
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by the UN. The USA and many EU states nevertheless proceeded to act unilaterally 
during 2007 by preparing for independence in the expectation that UN approval was a fait 
accompli. It was on this basis that the EULEX mission was prepared in late 2007 to early 
2008 to replace the UN role in ‘monitoring, mentoring, advising’ (MMA) Kosovo 
towards full independence. 
The EU divisions over recognition of Kosovo’s independence clouded the EULEX 
mission with legal uncertainty. Ultimately the mission was deployed, but under the 
existing UN mandate. The EU has taken the lead in securing Kosovo’s compliance with 
the ‘multiethnic’ concept of the state. The Kosovo Constitution adopted in June 2008 was 
drafted with the assistance of EU and US experts. The Albanians came under strong 
pressure to adhere fully to Ahtisaari’s recommendations for the ‘highest standards’ of 
minority protection.36 These include: quota representation in government and the 
Assembly, special language and education rights, low-level decentralization and the 
redrawing of municipal boundaries to favour minorities (currently under way). The 
standards are so high and the population thresholds for minority rights are so low that 
they have no match in any other European country. Potentially, the ‘Ahtisaari Plan’, and 
the imposition of the plan in the new Constitution of Kosovo and the enabling laws of 
summer 2008, will recreate parallel communities on a significant scale in Kosovo. The 
decentralization scheme for Kosovo entailed in the ‘Ahtisaari Plan’ appears to have 
been informed by the view that Kosovo was a divided society, much like Northern 
Ireland. This was true of Kosovo in the 1980s and 1990s, but such a formulation was 
an invention after the wholescale forced displacement of Serbs and Roma from most of 
Kosovo in 1999. His complex institutional engineering for minority protection was 
designed with the Serbs in mind. In the absence of the Serb population, however, a 
‘multiethnic’ concept of the state seems unworkable and only likely to antagonize the 
Albanian population and destabilize the peace. 
 
Despite the EU support for a ‘multiethnic’ Kosovo, the country was an overwhelmingly 
homogenous society—93% Albanian—even before the conflict of 1999. The country is, 
however, in a dire economic situation, with at least 40% unemployment, high levels of 
out-migration, and many families relying on remittances. Estimates vary of the pre- 
1999 Serb population, from 200,000 to 250,000. Few Serbs remained in Kosovo after 
the interethnic violence of 1999–2000 and the fresh Albanian attacks of March 2004. 
The vast majority of the Serb population lives in Kosovo in the special UN-administered 
zone in Northern Mitrovica and are unlikely ever to become subordinate to the 
government of Kosovo. Kosovo is de facto a partitioned entity.37 A small number of 
Serbs live in a few enclaves inside Kosovo, such as in Grazanica. The UN administration 
is supposed to manage the return of refugees, restore their property and provide security. 
However, there are no reliable statistical measures of numbers of returnees, let alone the 
number of Serbs actually residing in Kosovo. According to UNHCR, the total number of 
all minority returnees since 2000 (to 2007) is estimated to be 17,821, but no figures are 
kept on how many returnees actually remain permanently residing in Kosovo. Given the 
weak security provided to returnees by local police and KFOR and the intensity of 
Albanian violence against returnees, it is probable that many returnees return only to sell 
up their property, and then return to safe zones such as Northern Mitrovica. An indication 
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of the low priority attached to refugee returns by the Kosovo government is the small 
allocation of just E5.2 million from the Kosovo budget in 2007 to support the policy. 
 
The ‘multiethnic’ constitutional framework will only be feasible if the Serbs return on a 
mass scale. However, the security costs of this would be so high that it is not feasible and, 
in practice, return is informally discouraged by KFOR. In place of large-scale returns, the 
policy emphasis has taken a declamatory turn in recent years, concentrating on delivering 
the return of small numbers in a small number of high-profile projects with small funding 
allocations. For example, six ‘Organized Returns projects’ costing E3.7 million were 
launched in 2007, five of which were completed, leading to the return of 108 families.38 
The process of property restitution presided over by UNMIK’s Housing and Property 
Directorate (HPD) in 1999–2006 failed to facilitate return of any significance by Serbs. 
Despite a small number of high-profile evictions with wide media coverage (e.g. the 
Velika Reka case), HPD actually managed to adjudicate for the restitution of just 2,377 
properties out of some 27,000 cases (and most of these have probably been repossessed 
for the purpose of selling on to Albanians).39 No data are kept as to the sustainability of 
these returns. A recent independent report stated: ‘nine years of international 
administration have failed to unmake the powers of ethnic cleansing’.40 At this rate of 
property restitution the pre-1999 Serb population would require hundreds of years to 
obtain even the potential of return to Kosovo. One measure of the low number of Serbs is 
the Government of Kosovo Statistical Office data on live births for 2007, which recorded 
just seven births to Serb mothers, and almost 32,000 to Albanian mothers.41 
 
The Albanian political elite accept the ‘multiethnic’ nomenclature imposed on it by the 
‘Ahtisaari Plan’ for transient instrumental reasons—to secure international support for 
independence. The universal Albanian view is that the ‘multiethnic’ framework will be 
removed by the Kosovo government or will be superseded by a new constitution or 
legal framework within ‘a few years’.42 As the current system lacks ‘local ownership’, 
it seems inevitable that it will be superseded in due course. 
 
Currently, Kosovo is not ‘multiethnic’ and the strong probability is that it never will be 
in any meaningful sense. The return of the Serb minority on any significant scale is very 
unlikely as it would require a major security operation, with a KFOR troop increase to 
many tens of thousands, and would in any event most probably be violently resisted by 
the Albanians. The return of Serb property on a large scale would also probably lead to 
an Albanian revolt. After 8 years of UN administration, UNMIK’s efforts to rebuild 
Kosovo as a multiethnic society have failed. The UN, OSCE and KFOR peace-building 
operation collectively has failed to establish conditions in Kosovo that are conducive to 
the safe return of Serb refugees and displaced persons. It seems likely that the EULEX 
mission will suffer a similar fate. 
 
As the EU now plays a leading role in Kosovo, a major issue is whether it accepts the 
segregated nature of Kosovo, admits that the ‘multiethnic’ concept has failed under the 
UN, or whether it actively seeks to break down the societal divisions. The Northern 
Ireland conflict ‘model’ demonstrates that even in a low-scale protracted conflict, the 
realities of the divided society must be recognized in the settlement through some form of 
 14
consociational governmental arrangements. Moreover, the Belfast Agreement did not 
make any substantive provision, nor has there since been any significant policy effort, 
to break down the two main structures of sectarian social division in Northern Ireland: 
segregated public housing, and segregated and parallel education systems. In interviews 
with officials in the Council, the author was told that the EU informally tried to stop 
Ahtisaari’s emphasis on a ‘multiethnic’ Kosovo, recognizing that this was impossible to 
achieve without a major security operation. The EU preferred the more vacuous term 
‘coexistence’ of communities and more diluted constitutional provisions for minorities. 
Officials in the Council and Commission accept, as one put it, that ‘we pay a lot of lip 
service to reconciliation’, but equally much of the EU’s work in the Western Balkans 
involves many issues related to reconciliation and transitional justice: refugees’ return, 
for example.43 Even on the issue of refugees and property restoration, however, there is a 
huge gulf between the sustained efforts that have been made elsewhere in the Western 
Balkans (notably in Bosnia and Herzegovina where refugee return is a major EU priority) 
and the lack of commitment to the issue in Kosovo. The EU’s aid to Kosovo via the 
Instrument of Pre-accession Assistance (IPA) was E184.7 million in 2008, of which just 
E4 million was directed at ‘the sustainable return and reintegration of refugees and 
displaced people’, whereas some E38 million was allocated to renovate central 
municipal, district and Supreme Court buildings and prosecutorial offices ‘to complement 
EULEX initiatives’. The salience of the EU’s work in Kosovo is directed at institutional 
reform and capacity-building and border management, and that places a serious question 
mark over the commitment of the EU to sustaining the implementation of the 
‘multiethnic’ dimension of the Ahtisaari Plan.44 
 
There is a potential dilemma for the EU in that it could allow its funding programmes to 
become directed at promoting the diseconomies of a divided society that are entailed in a 
‘multiethnic’ Kosovo, including the controversial decentralization process currently 
under way. Such funding would most probably build social capital within communities, 
much as PR-I and PR-II in Northern Ireland. Only in PR-III in Northern Ireland did the 
EU belatedly focus its priorities on economic development. The lesson from Northern 
Ireland is to focus on economic development in Kosovo early. The homogenous nature of 
the society makes this kind of prioritization potentially even more effective as there are 
fewer diseconomies of division. By accepting that the ‘multiethnic’ dimension is 
unworkable and destabilizing, the EU could focus its energies on the association aspects 
of SAP. It suggests that socio-economic stabilization would be a much more effective 
policy choice for the EU in Kosovo. 
 
Current EU policy appears to exhibit many tensions and contradictions. The list of 
priority areas and benchmarks included under the rubric of minority rights and the 
protection of minorities in the 2007 European Partnership for Kosovo is substantially 
greater than in previous documents. It includes issues ranging from completing 
legislation for refugee return and property rights to adopting laws on public broadcasting 
and against civil defamation, to developing an integrated conservation policy for cultural 
heritage and creating a climate for reconciliation, interethnic tolerance and sustainable 
multiethnicity.45 The EU appears to be rhetorically entrapped yet again. While one of the 
goals of the EULEX mission is to deliver on the rule of law dimension of the 
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‘multiethnic’ strategy for Kosovo, other EU policy moves since 2007, notably 
the replacement of the CARDS programme by the IPA, suggest that the EU’s approach to 
Kosovo is focusing more on economic developmental and institution-building issues 
rather than ‘reconciliation’ and return.46 The potential for confusion is magnified also 
by the overlapping and unclear hierarchy between the EUSR, EULEX and the 
Commission’s Liaison Office. 
 
 Another point of comparison with Northern Ireland is the question of transitional justice. 
Intentionally peripheralized in the Northern Ireland peace process, the issue has high 
political salience in the Western Balkans region, including Kosovo. The International 
Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia has been one of the spearheads for the 
implementation of transitional justice as a new legal norm in international law. Locally, 
missing persons is perhaps the most persistent source of antagonism (some 1,500 
outstanding cases in Kosovo, mainly Albanians). Moreover, states involved in the 
conflict as protagonists (whether Britain or Serbia) also have an interest in blocking 
transitional justice approaches such as truth commissions. States have an interest in 
sustaining their own well-established frames and narratives of the conflicts, and 
protecting their agents from accountability for crimes committed during ‘dirty wars’. In 
Kosovo some elites favour a ‘culture of silence’ similar to that of Northern Ireland, 
whereas others persist with notions of securing trials and investigations.47 Adopting a 
South American technique, families of missing persons post rows of photographs of 
missing persons on the gates of government buildings in Pristina, while the appeals of 
relatives are not considered a priority by the political elites. On the other hand, one of the 
dilemmas facing the EULEX mission will be the extent to which it confronts the backlog 
of war crime cases in Kosovo, and pursues KLA veterans and Albanian civilians for war 
crimes. A recent report by Amnesty International highlighted how the UN administration 
has failed to address issues of transitional justice in Kosovo, while tolerating impunity for 
perpetrators in Kosovo and Serbia.48 Many KLA veterans occupy elite positions in 
Kosovo. To pursue them would risk renewed violence and instability. It seems likely, 
consequently, that EULEX will be forced into the kind of compromise and trade-off seen 
in Northern Ireland, sacrificing transitional justice to a workable political 
accommodation. 
 
Conclusion 
 
It is often quipped with some discontent by EU officials informally that the EU’s main 
function is to act as paymaster in conflicts—often bank-rolling the costs of reconstruction 
and development without being given a major stake in setting the strategy for peace and 
reconciliation. We have examined two major conflict cases in which there has been an 
immense injection of EU funding and also significant EU political capital expended. 
Both of the cases analysed provide much evidence for a lack of strategic thinking 
within the EU about some of the fundamental concepts in conflict management, 
irrespective of the EU’s capability or intention to intervene directly. The EU’s capability 
for conflict management has developed immensely over the last decade. Kosovo is 
inundated with EU personnel and a variety of EU offices that are directly and routinely 
involved in agenda setting and policy-making. However, huge sums of EU funding 
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have been expended in Northern Ireland and Kosovo without much deep strategic 
policy thinking about what peace and reconciliation means in either context, how it 
relates to a political accommodation, or how aid might contribute to stability and a 
sustainable end to conflict. Both cases demonstrate a disconnect between EU rhetoric and 
policy implementation in a specific case. It is as if the EU regards both of these cases, 
despite the rhetoric about the lessons to be learned from Northern Ireland’s’model’, as sui 
generis. Both cases are disconnected from EU policy statements elaborating its strategy 
on conflict management. On the one hand, Northern Ireland’s lessons (embedding the 
structures of division through power-sharing; no transitional justice) have been ignored 
and excluded from the EU’s public strategy, while on the other hand, de facto policy in 
Kosovo to maintain the ethnic homogeneity of the territory contravenes many of the 
normative goals articulated in EU strategic thinking on conflict management. The 
dilemma for the EU’s role in Kosovo is that to manufacture or reconfigure a ‘multiethnic’ 
state would require a massive military operation and authoritarian response to resistance. 
The facts on the ground are that Kosovo is an overwhelmingly homogenous state of 
Albanians. In due course its political and legal structures will reflect this. The EU’s role 
can be effective only if it works with this reality.  
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